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Abstract
Modern cyber-physical systems (CPS), such as our energy infrastructure, are
becoming increasingly complex: An ever-higher share of Artificial Intelligence
(AI)-based technologies use the Information and Communication Technology (ICT)
facet of energy systems for operation optimization, cost efficiency, and to reach
CO2 goals worldwide. At the same time, markets with increased flexibility and ever
shorter trade horizons enable the multi-stakeholder situation that is emerging in
this setting. These systems still form critical infrastructures that need to perform
with highest reliability. However, today’s CPS are becoming too complex to be
analyzed in the traditional monolithic approach, where each domain, e.g., power
grid and ICT as well as the energy market, are considered as separate entities while
ignoring dependencies and side-effects. To achieve an overall analysis, we introduce
the concept for an application of distributed artificial intelligence as a self-adaptive
analysis tool that is able to analyze the dependencies between domains in CPS by
attacking them. It eschews pre-configured domain knowledge, instead exploring the
CPS domains for emergent risk situations and exploitable loopholes in codices,
with a focus on rational market actors that exploit the system while still following
the market rules.
Keywords: Cyber-Physical Systems Analysis; Distributed Artificial Intelligence;
Reinforcement Learning; ICT Security; Market Design
1 Introduction and Related Work
During the last two decades, the power grid has seen an enormous development in
the adoption of Information and Communication Technology (ICT) on a large scale
in order to facilitate the inclusion of advanced methodologies, including Artificial
Intelligence (AI)-based approaches. This increases efficiency and flexibility, which
ultimately allows a higher share of renewable energy sources in the grid. However,
together with a proceeding decentralization and the inclusion of energy markets, the
complexity of the overall system also increased, with different factors adding to it,
e.g., prosumers directly selling their Photovoltaic (PV) power or new market-based
concepts for ancillary service provisioning, which need to be implemented by 2021
as per EU regulations [1].
Decentralized generation and consumption has led to the emergence of decentralized
grid operation and control paradigms, many of which feature independent software
agents. These Multi Agent Systems (MAS) exist for different tasks, e.g., to equalize
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real power generation and consumption, or to facilitate voltage control on local
levels. A newer example of such a decentralized, specifically all-encompassing MAS
that is aimed at including a high share of volatile, renewable energy sources is the
Universal Smart Grid Agent system [2–4].
Assuming that major Internet of Things (IoT) trends will also influence the
future power grid, the comprehensive use of ICT and AI technologies will, through
their complexity, inevitably create an obstacle for a reliable operation of the power
grid [5, 6]. At least since the cyber attack on the power grid of the Ukraine in
December 2015 [7, 8], energy systems are recognized as valuable and vulnerable
targets. Further attacks were seen in different stages with varying targets until
2017 [9]. These attacks demonstrate how ICT has a vital role in modern energy
distribution networks. It needs to be reliable to ensure a stable power grid. However,
due to the increasing ICT in modern power grids, the attack surface is getting bigger.
Darknet marketplaces offer DDoS-as-a-Service and other attack-services for small
money [10], which demonstrates that security testing is getting more important in
this special domain.
Research actively addresses the numerous challenges that arise from the increased
complexity and, thus, new attack vectors the emerge not only in the energy domain,
but all cyber-physical systems (CPS) in general. Among them are neural control
falsification, e.g., through Adversarial Learning (AL) [11–13], false data injection
as attacks on state estimators [14–18], or utilizing compromised assets to actively
damage the CPS [19].
In addition, a new type of attack has emerged in market-connected CPS like
energy systems: The attack as a side effect of economically rational behavior. Energy
markets are highly regulated in all countries. The need for regulation directly follows
from the energy systems’ inherent dependability on a dedicated infrastructure, like
power grids, gas and heat networks. With this kind of infrastructure, a natural
monopoly is given. To ensure system stability while optimizing costs, market-based
approaches are regulated to realize access to this infrastructure and system stability
responsibility. The adaption of regulative frameworks is late by design: Once a
loophole has been found, regulation is readjusted. Even if no outright cyber-attack
is staged, actors in the market might exploit loopholes while still conforming to the
rules. There are a couple of known examples where this has been done and actually
affected the power grid, e.g., in Germany with Inc-Dec Gaming against the zonal
system with uniform pricing scheme [20], or in another case in Great Britain [21].
However, in a recent survey looking at CPS from the perspective of AI research, we
found that a large portion of research focuses on a safe inclusion of AI technologies,
such as Deep Learning or decentralized control through MAS in critical infrastruc-
tures, but also emphasizes the gaps between almost fully analyzed, reliable CPS and
the complexity introduced by these techniques. Additionally, there is currently no
systemic analysis approach that includes AI technologies as the driver to explore and
analyze unknown CPS for safety [22]. This survey can be seen as the main motiva-
tional background for this work: Traditional methods for analyzing the operational
safety of a CPS can only cover specific, partial aspects. Hence, we found extensive
research into many different aspects of safe CPS operation, but no approach for
systemic testing of intra- and inter-domain relationships. From the point of the
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analysis, this causes a fragmentation of the whole system into islands. Aggregating
subsystems also means that the effects of the interaction of components as well
as the influence of market actors is not completely covered. This holds especially
true for systemic vulnerabilities, in which isolated parameters are within nominal
boundaries, but the overall system is being destabilized through emergent effects. On
the basis of the challenges outlined above, we create an intelligent, cross-sectional
software technology for analyzing complex CPS in project PYRATE. It analyzes
complex CPS with interdependent components autonomously, finding vulnerabilities
leading to systemic failures. The core of the software technology to be developed
is based on learning software agents that interact with a model—ideally a digital
twin—of a CPS, using the resulting system states as reinforcing feedback signals for
full self-adaptivity to efficiently explore the search space of actions for destabilizing
ones.
Our project works on two different levels: On a methodical level, we plan to
develop a universal methodology to analyze weaknesses of arbitrary CPS by finding
successful attack strategies. On a practical level, we apply this methodology to an
exemplary scenario containing a power system, an ancillary service market, and
an ICT system, to demonstrate possible applications and the effectiveness of the
methodology.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Due to didactic reasons, we first
introduce the three environments of our demonstrator, explain major challenges in
them, and describe the co-simulation setup. Afterwards, we follow with a description
of our cross-domain learning MAS that explores a CPS in order to defeat it. The
experimentation process that underpins any analysis of our technology is described
next, followed by the post-run analysis that aims to isolate the minimal chain of
actions that led to CPS failure. Finally, we conclude with an outlook towards the
realization.
Environment Under Scrutiny: A Demonstrator
In the research project, a power grid, an ICT network, and a local ancillary service
market are simultaneously subjected to analysis, since the goal is to analyze inter-
dependent behavior. Since the analysis cannot be performed on real infrastructure
for obvious reasons, simulation models of each of the different domains are being
synchronized at run-time using a co-simulation approach.
Power System
In this project’s demonstrator, we focus on distribution grids to show the feasibility
of the approach. Today’s distribution grids lend themselves very well: They contain
both, distributed large and aggregateable small loads, connect the major portion of
Distributed Energy Resources (DERs), and are currently subject to large-scale ICT
inclusion as well as the development of local ancillary market concepts. Furthermore,
they form the smallest meaningful, mostly self-contained environment that features
a complex CPS with a variety of outside influence factors such as volatile power
generation from renewable energy sources.
For simulation and benchmark purposes on distribution grid level, a scenario-based
benchmark environment was developed. This benchmark environment incorporates a
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medium voltage (MV) grid developed by the International Council on Large Electric
Systems (CIGRE) [23, 24], time series data of one year in 15min resolution (e.g.,
for wind, solar radiation, or consumption) from a former research project Smart
Nord [25] and different component models like PV or combined heat and power
(CHP).
Ancillary Service Market
For current energy markets, regulation is mainly settled, though adaptions still
can be seen quite often, e.g., for optimization reasons. When implementing new
energy markets, a whole new set of regulations is needed, though: There is a lot of
activity in the implementation of regional energy markets and cell-based approaches,
which are still in their infancy. Thus, we can expect many upcoming iterations on
the regulation sets [26]. This holds especially true for all kinds of ancillary service
markets, e.g., reactive power or flexibility markets [27, 28].
In this context, even new problems arise: We found that, for grid-stabilizing ancil-
lary service markets, regional actors and even private households could cooperatively
induce problems into the grid to later get paid for eliminating these very problems.
E.g., if we assume that the grid operator has to procure reactive power in a purely
market-based way, private households could synchronize their load behavior in order
to manipulate the local voltage level and to violate the voltage band. That forces
the grid operator to announce a reactive power auction, in which generator agents
would offer reactive power provision as ancillary service. Afterwards, the generator
and household agents would divide profits and start a new attack. Regulation for
such problems is not known at all, especially as this kind of malicious behavior is
difficult to detect and proof.
Our methodology will help to systematically investigate and understand such
profit-driven attacks, which will in turn allow for better market designs. For this, a
local auction-based reactive power market with simple rules will be implemented
as incentive for profit-driven attacks. This will allow for better understanding of
possible attack vectors for profit maximization. Later, systematic comparison with
more sophisticated market designs and rules will enable insights which market rules
increase resilience against which attack strategies. Finally, we hope to find market
designs that minimize attacks and that maximize grid stability as well as detectability
of such attacks.
ICT Simulation
Distributed power units are equipped with ICT to connect to wide-area networks.
This enables operators to regulate and monitor distributed locations remotely, which
is the foundation for implementing local ancillary service markets at the distribu-
tion grid level. The CIGRE MV model only specifies a distribution grid topology
without covering the ICT domain, thus, we extend and overlay it with relevant
ICT components to model a realistic multi-domain distribution grid infrastructure.
Consequently, each node of the energy grid is accompanied by the corresponding
representation in the ICT network that would, in reality, provide access to relevant
sensors and actuators. Additionally, a communication network is built with routers
and switches that connects these CPS, arranged in multiple subnets, hence modelling
a realistic ICT network.
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Figure 1 The Demonstrator’s Co-Simulated Environments for Analysis
Specific requirements arise from the multi-domain co-simulation setting: First,
it needs to be efficient at simulating large networks. Second, the ICT simulation
is required to create an accurate model of the reality and, therefore, compute
realistic results, which is especially important when examining networks in a security
context. Thus, it is necessary that existing software can be integrated with minimal
modifications. Lastly, the simulation tool needs to be easy-to-use, so that also experts
of the other simulated domains—who might have limited knowledge about ICT
networks—can work with it after a short period of time. As there is no such simulator
available that can meet all of these requirements, the rettij network simulator was
developed. It is designed to simulate ICT components like routers, switches, clients
and servers, provided as Docker containers [29] in order to represent a realistic
behaviour as opposed to synthetic, simulated models. The configuration files of the
ICT simulator integrate tightly with the rest of the software stack [30]
Co-Simulation
The multi-domain simulation for analysis can hardly be performed by one software
tool alone. The setup of the last three sections describes three different, but inter-
twined, domains; each one warrants its own specific simulation software to yield
realistic results [31] In addition, specific models for power plants, wind parks, or
independent market actors exist. These components are coordinated with the open-
source co-simulation framework mosaik [32] and can therefore easily be integrated
in other simulation setups relying on mosaik.
Figure 1 shows the complete software stack. The bottom box, labelled co-simulation,
provides the technical view of the different simulators. Each simulator offers mod-
els as well as attributes on these models, which form a hierarchy: The address
scheme Simulator.Model.Attribute allows for unambiguous identification of each
individual attribute and to connect them. E.g., ARL.Attacker-1.Actuator-1
can be connected to PowerGrid.WindFarm-1.P-Feedin to deliver setpoints
from the adaptive attacker agent to a wind farm under its control; similarly,
PowerGrid.Sensor-1.Voltage, connected to ARL.Attacker-1.Sensor-1, allows
the agent to measure the effects of its actions in terms of voltage values. mosaik
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synchronizes all simulators with each other and provides a common simulation clock
time, the time step; data is transmitted to a simulator when it is stepped, data from
its models’ attributes is queried afterwards.
Distributed Analysis: Communication & Control
To analyse this interconnected complex system, the core tool is the application of
the Adversarial Resilience Learning (ARL) methodology. ARL defines in its pure
form [33] two classes of agents: attacker agents and defender agents. An instance
of every class operates on a model of a CPS, i.e., both agents operate on the same
shared model. However, neither attacker nor defender know of each other: They
gather data from the CPS through their sensors, which retrieve the current state of
the system—as far as it is observable to the respective agent—, but do not explicitly
track changes induced by another party.
This specific distinction makes sense for the power grid as well as for many other
CPS: Whether a voltage irregularity is induced by a larger PV feed-in at the end
of the branch (e.g., coming from a farm) or forms a part of an attack, is hardly
distinguishable, but needs to be countered in any case. Stringently, we assume
that the defender needs to counter a variety of effects for resilient operation, from
fluctuation in renewable feed-in to accidents to actual attacks without differentiating
between them as a rule-based system would do. Therefore, neither the overall system
design nor the experimenter differentiates between different causes and effects, leaving
the development of strategies as well as countering the adaption of the attacker
to the defender’s capability to adapt (and vice versa). That both agents learn to
counter each other’s strategies, thus developing them further and further, is the core
of the system-of-systems learning principle of ARL [34]. Consequently, we use the
attacker not just to execute actual cyber-attacks, but to represent any potentially
system-harming behavior. Thus, the attacker becomes a universal analysis tool.
Focusing on the attacker, we consider a group of attacking ARL agents that
form a self-organizing MAS and a single defender agent that represents the grid
operator. All ARL agents use a modified Reinforcement Learning (RL) algorithm to
explore a system that is initially unknown to them. In fact, ARL agents possess no
domain-specific knowledge; their sensors and actuators contain only a description of
the space for valid values. For the experimenter, these space types provide an easy
way to describe types and boundaries for values; they can also be used as predicates
to check whether a concrete value is a valid member of the given space. E.g., for a
given value x, x is a member of the space Discrete{x} iff:
Discrete{n} : x ∈ N, 0 ≤ x ≤ n− 1 . (1)
Similarly, we can denote a box in Rn and check for a value x to be a member of it:
Box
{
(l1, . . . , ln), (h1, . . . , hn)
}
: x ∈ R,
n∧
i=1
li ≤ x ≤ hi . (2)
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Other space types are MultiDiscrete, MultiBinary, or Tuple. Such a space descrip-
tion might represent the state of a tap-changer or the feed-in of a power plant in
terms of a faction of its nominal output, but this logic is completely hidden from
the agent. In fact, the domain logic is the responsibility of the experimenter. As
the only way for RL agents to learn is to receive feedback, the experimenter has to
derive a proper reward function that covers the relevant aspects of the CPS. The
reward function bridges the otherwise separated concerns, i.e., the ARL perspective
that eschews domain knowledge and the CPS domain.
Because of this feature, we describe the agents as being polymorphic. Drawing
from the analogy in software engineering, the agents’ interfaces are fixed and soundly
described, but do not carry any model. That means, the space types assigned
to the agents’ sensors and actuators form a declaration, but no definition. The
agents derive this definition—i.e., their model—through exploration. Hence, they
are polymorphic. This means that an abstract definition of a CPS’ interface in terms
of the spaces outlined above is enough to have the ARL agents explore the systems;
this constitutes a fundamental difference from many modelling and analysis tools
that require implicit or explicit modelling of the target domain.
As part of this new research direction, we assume that MAS are a valid approach
to analyze highly decentralized systems as depicted above: They inherently allow for
a representation of local knowledge and rule sets, even learned one, such as a limited
view on local grid state and local control options [35]. It has already been shown that
a combination with cyber-physical energy system simulation is feasible and beneficial
to analyze the distributed behavior of the system, even for socio-technical system
views [36]. Thus, we use MAS to represent and explore the effect of cooperative
malicious actors. In this case, cooperative means that the agents act cooperatively
within their defined group of malicious or unplanned malicious, simply economically
rational, agents. The attackers share a reward function, which can be as easy as
the amount of money gained from the market, but also be complex and encompass
aspects of all domains. In any case, the reward function remains transparent to each
attacker and does not convey any domain knowledge to the agents, but is defined
solely at the discretion of the experimenter.
In the presented concept, the overall MAS encompasses all three domains. Indi-
vidual agents represent different actors in one of the domains. E.g., in a scenario,
in which the attacker MAS controls three assets in the power grid, has one entry
point to the ICT network, and appears with one bidder on the market, the MAS is
comprised of five agents. An example for sensor and actuator mappings is presented
in table 1.
In order to develop an overall strategy, the attackers need to coordinate among
themselves without a central command-&-control instance. Snapshot algorithms
[37] will be used to enable the agents to interchange their local sensor data to gain
knowledge of the global state. In this case, global state means the entirety of all
sensors that the ARL agents have access to. Learning agents that perform decision
making based on shared knowledge can then learn optimal cooperative decision
making based on that knowledge. With this research direction, we thrive for the
development of a domain-encompassing coordination protocol to address this holistic
approach to CPS analysis.
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Table 1 Exemplary ARL Attacker MAS that can participate in a reactive power market
Agent Asset Sensors Actuators
a1 PV Unit Voltage1, Max. Active Power2 Active Power2, Reactive Power3
a2 EV Charger Voltage1, Active Power2 Active Power2, Reactive Power3
a3 Load Voltage1, Active Power2, Reactive
Power3
Active Power2
a4 Market Reactive Power Commitment
(relative)3
Reactive Power Offer (relative)3
a5 ICT Interface Utilization2 Manipulate Sensor Value (Apply
Noise)3
1Box
{
(0.85), (1.15)
}
, 2Box
{
(0.0), (1.0)
}
, 3Box
{
(−1.0), (1.0)}
While malicious cooperation cannot be deduced directly from regulatory or observ-
ability loopholes, beneficial cooperative behavior is analyzed as well: the defender
aims to stabilize the system and prevent malicious attacks.
In our research approach, we therefore combine these agent types to act in shared
environments. Thus, we hope to identify ruleset, ICT, and market designs that
minimize attack possibilities and stabilize the overall system. In future work, we
will define and work out the resulting multi-layer attack coordination and defense
framework.
Experiment Process
As Figure 2 illustrates, the overall experiment process incorporates four major steps:
First, a domain independent description of the CPS and its interfaces is required.
The definition of such a description is called CPS Abstract Ontology (CPS-AO) in
the context of the presented research direction. The main purpose of the CPS-AO is
the definition of network topological variables and the mapping of the ARL agents’
sensors and actuators to entities in the environment. Additionally, the CPS-AO
defines which variables can be changed during the experiments and the valid value
ranges. Furthermore, the CPS-AO takes this topology information to build up
experiments. For this purposes, CPS-AO employs techniques from the domain of
design of experiments (DoE) [38] to select only configurations that provide the
strongest significance. An example for a CPS-AO configuration file can be seen in
Figure 3.
Furthermore, the CPS-AO serves as an input for the so-called experiment generator
(CPS-EG). While the CPS-AO is a domain-independent and abstract description
of the system, the CPS-EG instantiates the experiment descriptions for the actual
simulation, assigns values to factors, and builds execution scripts.
All so generated concrete experiments are executed by an experiment executor
(CPS-EE) in the target environment. This provides the actual interface between
the agent structure and the simulation environment. In order to enable changes,
the created intermediate results will be saved so that smaller changes are possible
without having to go through the entire process again. During the execution of the
experiments, the states of the simulation as well as the actions of the agents and the
market results are stored and thus made available for a later weak point analysis,
which will be described in the following section.
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?
Figure 2 Experiment process of the presented research approach
!CPSAO
cps : ! CPS # the s y s t e m
engine : # e . g . m o s a i k
ap i : # how to i n s t a n t i a t e
s en so r s : # l i s t of U I D s
ac tua to r s : # l i s t of U I D s
doe:
runs :
f a c t o r s : # DoE i n p u t s
q u a l i t i e s : # DoE o u t p u t s
s t r a t egy : # how to s a m p l e
# e . g . L a t i n H y p e r c u b e
agents : # two or m o r e
− ! Agent
# if m o r e t h a n one o p t i o n
# is p r e s e n t in the a g e n t ’ s
# d e f i n i t i o n , t h e y w i l l be
# c o n s i d e r e d for DoE
name: # c o n v e n i e n c e
s en so r s : # l i s t of U I D s
ac tua to r s : # l i s t of U I D s
s t r a t e g i e s : # how to win
rewards : #
− ! Agent # s a m e as a b o v e
Figure 3 A minimal example for a CPS-AO file. Additional parameters have been removed for the
sake of brevity.
Post-Run Analysis Methodology
The experimenter defines a set of invariants that describe the environment’s overall
health. After the executor has finished the simulation run and health invariants
were falsified, a post-mortem analysis of the defeated system shall be conducted.
This CPS Vulnerability Analyzer (CPS-VA) conducts targeted evaluation of the
attacks across all domains, aiming to find the smallest chain of stringent actions
that defeated this system, i.e. to identify the cross-domain attack-path or kill-chain.
We assume that the ARL MAS, in its exploration, conducts a lot of negligible action
before staging a successful attack. Hence, identification of the minimal kill-chain is
a separate analysis task.
Another goal of the research project is the development of the CPS-VA, which
primarily aims to understand the produced data. It operates on data from all nodes,
i.e. data from sensors and actuators. The transactions on the market as well as
states from the ICT and the power grid are collected. Then, the CPS-VA is designed
to apply different analysis techniques on this data to isolate the kill-chain. For
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understanding the path of the kill-chain, predictive models and techniques are often
not the best choice [39]. Most of the time, causality methods are more promising.
Mueller, Memory, and Bartrem [40] use causal discovery techniques to discover
cyber kill-chains; therefore, data is presented as a Causal Bayesian Network (CBN).
Finding the right methodology to explain the experiment’s outcome is also part of
the development of the CPS-VA and will start as soon as first datasets are ready.
From the ICT security point of view, the task of the CPS-VA is somehow similar
to what threat detection tools are designed for, but so far they only focus on ICT
related data. The behaviour of the ARL agents can be treated as Advanced Persistent
Threats (APT). APTs can be described as sophisticated attack processes that are
often strategically-motivated and profit-focused [41]. Standard industry solutions
to detect APTs are so called Security Information and Event Management (SIEM)
systems. Such a system collects data from a wide variety of security applications
to detect suspicious traffic and behaviour in ICT systems. To make use of this
information, SIEM systems use correlation rules [42] and rise alarm in case of a
anomaly detection. The CPS-VA provides the opportunity to evaluate the idea of
SIEM systems towards new applications.
First, a reasonable model from all domains is used in simulation to manually
create simple correlation rules. This first step evaluates which information from the
domains is necessary and how to create suitable correlation rules to generate basic
knowledge for the next steps. Second, a much higher amount of relevant information
for the SIEM is expected. In correlating different experiment runs from a variety
of different scenarios—using, e.g., big data analytics [43]—, singular kill-chains can
be derived and, thus, the respective rules be created. We expect that, starting with
easy-to-observe critical states in the CPS, an isolation path beginning on the affected
components in the CPS can connect the critical states to market actors.
Outlook
Many CPS experience a broad addition of inputs, from self-driving capabilities
over user inputs and IoT technologies to a broad market adoption in the case of
power systems. The emergence of complex CPS cannot be covered by traditional
modelling and analysis techniques that can address only specific aspects of the overall
system. In this paper, we proposed the concept for an application of distributed
artificial intelligence as a self-adaptive analysis tool that is able to analyze the
interdependencies between domains in CPS, covering the whole system. It eschews
pre-configured domain knowledge, instead exploring the CPS domains for emergent
risk situations and exploitable loopholes in codices, with a special focus on rational
market actors that exploit the system while still following the rules of market.
In the future, we will demonstrate the feasibility of a cross-domain distributed
analysis, documenting the experimentation system, the coordinating MAS-based
exploration tool as well as the analysis tool. With the latter, we aim to extract a
reduced chain of actions leading to a cross-system exploitation, thereby isolating
attack vectors and loopholes in codices. Furthermore, we expect the use of polymor-
phic agents to lead to new insights in the field of RL. The ARL agent interaction
with the ICT, which forms a central piece of the concept, will give new valuable
insights of the ICT’s critical role in modern CPS. This will enhance research towards
new security tools for modern critical infrastructures.
Veith et al. Page 11 of 12
Acknowledgements
We would like to thank Sebastian Lehnhoff for his councel and valuable inputs.
Funding
This work was funded by the German Federal Ministry of Education and Research through the project PYRATE
(01IS19021A).
Availability of data and materials
Source code will be published after notification of acceptance.
Author’s contributions
All authors contributed equally to the paper.
Competing interests
The authors declare that they have no competing interests.
Author details
1Research Division Energy, OFFIS – Insitute for Information TechnologyOldenburgGermany. 2Department of
Energy Informatics, Leibniz University HannoverHannoverGermany. 3Department for Computer Networks and
Information Security, Hochschule BremenBremenGermany.
References
1. European Union: DIRECTIVE (EU) 2019/944 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE
COUNCIL of 5 June 2019 on common rules for the internal market for electricity and amending Directive
2012/27/EU (5 June 2019).
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32019L0944
2. Veith, E.M., Steinbach, B., Windeln, J.: A lightweight distributed software agent for automatic
demand—supply calculation in smart grids. International Journal On Advances in Internet Technology 7(1),
97–113 (2014). International Academy, Research, and Industry Association (IARIA)
3. Ruppert, M., Veith, E.M., Steinbach, B.: An evolutionary training algorithm for artificial neural networks
with dynamic offspring spread and implicit gradient information. In: The Sixth International Conference on
Emerging Network Intelligence (EMERGING 2014). IARIA XPS Press, ??? (2014). International Academy,
Research, and Industry Association (IARIA)
4. Veith, E.M.: Universal Smart Grid Agent for Distributed Power Generation Management. Logos Verlag
Berlin GmbH, Berlin, Germany (2017)
5. Hanseth, O., Ciborra, C.: Risk, Complexity and ICT. Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham, UK (2007)
6. Sculley, D., Holt, G., Golovin, D., Davydov, E., Phillips, T., Ebner, D., Chaudhary, V., Young, M.: Machine
Learning: The High Interest Credit Card of Technical Debt. SE4ML: Software Engineering for Machine
Learning (NIPS 2014 Workshop), 1–9 (2014)
7. Case, D.U.: Analysis of the cyber attack on the ukrainian power grid. Electricity Information Sharing and
Analysis Center (E-ISAC) (2016)
8. Styczynski, J., Beach-Westmoreland, N.: When the lights went out: Ukraine cybersecurity threat briefing.
Booz Allen Hamilton 12, 20 (2016)
9. Reuters: Ukrainian banks, electricity firm hit by fresh cyber attack (2017)
10. Crawley, A.: Hiring hackers. Network Security (9), 13–15 (2016)
11. Pei, K., Cao, Y., Yang, J., Jana, S.: DeepXplore: Automated whitebox testing of deep learning systems
(2017). 1705.06640
12. Gehr, T., Mirman, M., Drachsler-Cohen, D., Tsankov, P., Chaudhuri, S., Vechev, M.: AI2: Safety and
robustness certification of neural networks with abstract interpretation. In: 2018 IEEE Symposium on
Security and Privacy (SP), pp. 1–18. IEEE, ??? (2018)
13. Yaghoubi, S., Fainekos, G.: Gray-box adversarial testing for control systems with machine learning
components 1(1), 179–184 (2019). arXiv:1812.11958v1
14. Teixeira, A., Amin, S., Sandberg, H., Johansson, K.H., Sastry, S.S.: Cyber security analysis of state
estimators in electric power systems. Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on Decision and Control,
5991–5998 (2010)
15. Sandberg, H., Teixeira, A., Johansson, K.H.: On security indices for state estimators in power networks. In:
First Workshop on Secure Control Systems (SCS), Stockholm, 2010 (2010)
16. Liu, Y., Ning, P., Reiter, M.K.: False data injection attacks against state estimation in electric power grids.
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC) 14(1), 13 (2011)
17. Gao, S., Xie, L., Solar-Lezama, A., Serpanos, D., Shrobe, H.: Automated vulnerability analysis of ac state
estimation under constrained false data injection in electric power systems. In: Proceedings of the IEEE
Conference on Decision and Control, vol. 54, pp. 2613–2620. IEEE, ??? (2015)
18. Hu, L., Wang, Z., Han, Q.-L., Liu, X.: State estimation under false data injection attacks: Security analysis
and system protection. Automatica 87, 176–183 (2018)
19. Ju, P., Lin, X.: Adversarial attacks to distributed voltage control in power distribution networks with DERs.
In: Proceedings of the Ninth International Conference on Future Energy Systems, pp. 291–302 (2018).
ACM
20. Hirth, L., Schlecht, I.: Market-Based Redispatch in Zonal Electricity Markets. SSRN Electronic Journal
(055) (2018)
21. Konstantinidis, C., Strbac, G.: Empirics of intraday and real-time markets in Europe: Great Britain.
Technical report, DIW – Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Berlin, Germany (2015)
22. Veith, E.M., Fischer, L., Tröschel, M., Nieße, A.: Analyzing cyber-physical systems from the perspective of
artificial intelligence. In: Proceedings of the 2019 International Conference on Artificial Intelligence,
Veith et al. Page 12 of 12
Robotics and Control. AIRC ’19, pp. 85–95. Association for Computing Machinery, New York, NY, USA
(2019). https://doi.org/10.1145/3388218.3388222
23. Rudion, K., Orths, A., Styczynski, Z.A., Strunz, K.: Design of benchmark of medium voltage distribution
network for investigation of dg integration. In: 2006 IEEE Power Engineering Society General Meeting, p. 6
(2006). IEEE
24. CIGRE Task Force C6.04.02: Benchmark Systems for Network Integration of Renewable and Distributed
Energy Resources, (2014)
25. Hofmann, L., Sonnenschein, M.: Smart nord – final report. Hartmann GmbH (2015)
26. Weinhardt, C., Mengelkamp, E., Cramer, W., Hambridge, S., Hobert, A., Kremers, E., Otter, W., Pinson,
P., Tiefenbeck, V., Zade, M.: How far along are local energy markets in the DACH+ region?: A
comparative market engineering approach. In: Proceedings of the Tenth ACM International Conference on
Future Energy Systems, e-Energy 2019, Phoenix, AZ, USA, June 25-28, 2019, pp. 544–549. ACM, ???
(2019). https://doi.org/10.1145/3307772.3335318
27. Lilliu, F., Vinyals, M., Denysiuk, R., Recupero, D.R.: A novel payment scheme for trading renewable energy
in smart grid. In: Proceedings of the Tenth ACM International Conference on Future Energy Systems,
e-Energy 2019, Phoenix, AZ, USA, June 25-28, 2019, pp. 111–115. ACM, ??? (2019).
https://doi.org/10.1145/3307772.3328299
28. Chau, S.C., Xu, J., Bow, W., Elbassioni, K.M.: Peer-to-peer energy sharing: Effective cost-sharing
mechanisms and social efficiency. In: Proceedings of the Tenth ACM International Conference on Future
Energy Systems, e-Energy 2019, Phoenix, AZ, USA, June 25-28, 2019, pp. 215–225. ACM, ??? (2019).
https://doi.org/10.1145/3307772.3328312
29. The Docker developers: Docker Website. [Retrieved: 2020-05-26]. https://www.docker.com/
30. Woltjen, T., Gritzan, G., Kathmann, P., Sethmann, R.: Simulationsumgebung für IKT-Netze zur
Cyber-Abwehr. In: Tagungsband AALE 2020, pp. 233–239. VDE Verlag, ??? (2020)
31. Balduin, S., Tröschel, M., Lehnhoff, S.: Towards domain-specific surrogate models for smart grid
co-simulation. Energy Informatics 2(1), 27 (2019)
32. The mosaik Developers: mosaik Website. [Retrieved: 2020-05-26]. https://mosaik.offis.de/
33. Fischer, L., Memmen, J.-M., Veith, E.M., Tröschel, M.: Adversarial resilience learning—towards systemic
vulnerability analysis for large and complex systems. In: The Ninth International Conference on Smart Grids,
Green Communications and IT Energy-aware Technologies (ENERGY 2019), vol. 9, pp. 24–32 (2019)
34. Veith, E.M., Wenninghoff, N., Frost, E.: The Adversarial Resilience Learning Architecture for AI-based
Modelling, Exploration, and Operation of Complex Cyber-Physical Systems (2020). 2005.13601
35. Shoham, Y., Leyton-Brown, K.: Multiagent Systems - Algorithmic, Game-Theoretic, and Logical
Foundations. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, MA, USA (2009)
36. Praca, I., Morais, H., Ramos, C., Vale, Z., Khodr, H.: Multi-agent electricity market simulation with
dynamic strategies & virtual power producers. In: 2008 IEEE Power & Energy Society General Meeting, pp.
1–8. IEEE, Piscataway, NJ (2008)
37. Chandy, K.M., Lamport, L.: Distributed Snapshots: Determining Global States of Distributed Systems.
ACM Transactions on Computer Systems (TOCS) 3(1), 63–75 (1985)
38. Kleijnen, J.P.: Design and analysis of simulation experiments. In: International Workshop on Simulation,
pp. 3–22 (2015). Springer
39. Shmueli, G.: To Explain or to Predict? Statistical Science 25(3), 289–310 (2010). 1101.0891
40. Mueller, W.G., Memory, A., Bartrem, K.: Causal discovery of cyber attack phases. Proceedings - 18th
IEEE International Conference on Machine Learning and Applications, ICMLA 2019, 1348–1352 (2019)
41. Ahmad, A., Webb, J., Desouza, K.C., Boorman, J.: Strategically-motivated advanced persistent threat:
Definition, process, tactics and a disinformation model of counterattack. Computers & Security 86,
402–418 (2019)
42. Ambre, A., Shekokar, N.: Insider Threat Detection Using Log Analysis and Event Correlation. Procedia
Computer Science 45(C), 436–445 (2015)
43. Cardenas, A.a., Manadhata, P.K., Rajan, S.P.: Big data analytics for security. IEEE Security & Privacy
11(6), 74–76 (2013)
